2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Fundamental elements proposed by the European Union, in conformity with the common position adopted by the European Union Council of Ministers, to be inserted in the final document of the 2005 NPT Conference concerning Main Committee II

The 2005 Review Conference:

Should reach consensus on the basis of the framework established by the NPT by supporting the Decisions and the Resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and shall bear in mind the current situation and shall promote inter alia the following essential issues, including:

Non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations

1. Recognises that serious nuclear proliferation events have occurred since the end of the 2000 Review Conference.

2. Stresses the need to strengthen the role of the UN Security Council, as final arbiter, in order that it can take appropriate action in the event of non-compliance with NPT obligations, in keeping with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the application of safeguards.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

3. Calls on all States in the region to make the Middle East into an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in keeping with the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

4. Since security in Europe is linked to security in the Mediterranean, the Conference gives top priority to implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in that region.

5. Acknowledges the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones for peace and security, on the basis of arrangements freely entered into between the States of the region concerned.

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Nuclear terrorism

6. Stresses the need to do everything possible to prevent the risk of nuclear terrorism, linked to possible terrorist access to nuclear weapons or materials that could be used in the manufacture of radiological dispersal devices and, in this context, stresses the need for compliance with obligations under Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). Calls for tighter security for high-activity radioactive sources. Supports G8 and IAEA action in this regard.

7. Recognises that, in light of the increased threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the G8 Global Partnership Initiative should be approved.

IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols

8. Calls for universal accession to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols.

9. Recognises that Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols have a deterrent effect on nuclear proliferation and form today's verification standard, and continues to work for increased detectability of any violations of Treaty obligations.

10. Works for recognition by the IAEA Board of Governors that the conclusion of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol is today's verification standard.

11. Highlights the IAEA's unique role in verifying States' compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation commitments and helping them, on request, to tighten up the security of nuclear materials and installations, and calls on States to support the Agency.

Export controls

12. Recognises the importance of appropriate effective export controls, in compliance with Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and in accordance with Article III.2 of the NPT.

13. Stresses the necessity to implement, at national level, effective export, transit, transhipment and re-export controls, including appropriate laws and regulations for that purpose.

14. Stresses the necessity to enact effective criminal sanctions to deter illegal export, transit, brokering, trafficking and related financing, in compliance with UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004).

15. Urges the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to share their experience on export controls, so that all States can draw on the arrangements of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines.

16. Points to the need to strengthen the NSG Guidelines at an early date and to adapt them to new challenges in the field of non-proliferation.

Physical protection

17. Calls on the States Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to work for rapid conclusion of an amended Convention.